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Introduction

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The leader in affiliate marketing hyperlinks. He is called a hyperlink because he achieves goals far greater than what others achieve. As such, there will only be five to ten percent hyperlinks among all affiliates. Hyperlinks act as an email marketer, who has collected a large database of email addresses of potential customers trying to attract them. Hyperlinks almost always own their own websites and autoresponder. These tools facilitate him in his business.
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Got a web app + mobile app idea that could potentially help hundreds or thousands of team leaders who are into affiliate marketing. Where do I look for investors here in PH?

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You are the leader of convenient and extensive sales worldwide. It's a perfect tool for you to start a business! Start your own business easily to earn billions of dollars in a year! We provide a set of tools that you can use to maximize your marketing reach and overall revenue from Affiliate

You are the leader of convenient and extensive sales worldwide. It's a perfect tool for you to start a business! Start your own business easily to earn billions of dollars in a year! We provide a set of tools that you can use to maximize your marketing reach and overall revenue from Affiliate submitted by omidbehnam to u/omidbehnam [link] [comments]

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The Dominance of Public Ownership in the Chinese Socialist Market Economy

There are many that seem to believe that China today is a capitalist country, and that ever since 1978, China took the capitalist road. The relative decline of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in China in comparison to the private sector is used as damning evidence in favor of this view.
I will take this article for example:
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/why-chinas-state-owned-companies-still-have-a-key-role-to-play/
China’s private sector - which has been revving up since the global financial crisis - is now serving as the main driver of China’s economic growth. The combination of numbers 60/70/80/90 are frequently used to describe the private sector's contribution to the Chinese economy: they contribute 60% of China’s GDP, and are responsible for 70% of innovation, 80% of urban employment and provide 90% of new jobs. Private wealth is also responsible for 70% of investment and 90% of exports.
All of this is seemingly supported by official Chinese data AT FIRST GLANCE.
Taking a closer look, there may be problems in this combination of numbers. While China’s ownership structure has changed dramatically since reform began, claims that the private sector now dominates the economy may be exaggerated.
This comes from a misunderstanding of the use of the terms "state" and "nonstate" in Chinese official statistics.
https://www.heritage.org/testimony/chinese-state-owned-enterprises-and-us-china-economic-relations
The discussion of SOEs has been undermined by a fundamental error: the conflation of restructured, share-holding firms with the truly private sector. Share-holding SOEs are manifestly not private actors and assessments of the corporate sector that assume so are fatally flawed from the outset. The origin of this mistake is historical. As quasi-state entities emerged and proliferated, it was clear some sort of separate treatment was necessary and the concept of “non-state” was created. This was never intended to indicate “private”—quite the opposite: it was meant to signify that the creation of corporate forms quite different from SOEs could occur without privatization and its ideological pitfalls.
The meaning of “non-state” is very well understood by the Chinese government. The (sometimes willful) misunderstanding outside China rests on two shaky pillars. The first is a mis-rendering of “non-state”—where the PRC sees the opposite of state as non-state, many foreign observers see the opposite of state as “private” and simply re-label accordingly. The second is more sophisticated and based on the share-holding change.
Neither specification of share-holders nor sale of stock by itself does anything to alter state control. The large majority of firms listed on domestic stock markets are specifically designated as state-owned. The sale of small minority stakes on foreign exchanges could be construed as recasting mainstays such as CNPC (through its list vehicle PetroChina), China Mobile, and Chinalco as non-state entities of some form. However, they are still centrally directed SOEs, as explicitly indicated by the Chinese government.
Derek Scissors’s claim (the author of the article I am quoting) also has the support of empirical evidence as well.
https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-why-chinese-stocks-are-a-state-controlled-facade-2010-6
Even after the enactment of the non-tradable share reform in 2005, the free- float ratio of China A shares remains the lowest in Asia (Exhibit 27).
The State-owned Asset and Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is the government entity charged with holding and administering the large state-owned positions. These shares were classified as non-tradable until 2005, when the non-tradable share reform gave share dividends to free-float shareholders in exchange for making the government-held shares tradable (but with certain constraints). Over time, we believe that the SASAC will continue to sell down these holdings on the margin, while keeping the bulk of the shares.
Thus the control and ownership that U.S. share ownership represents is completely different than what Chinese share ownership represents. Simply put, Chinese shares don't translate into effective ownership of their underlying companies.
https://books.google.com/books/about/Capitalism_with_Chinese_Characteristics.html?id=YBpih2Q1X9kC&source=kp_book_description
The OECD economists assign the entire output by legal-person shareholding firms to the private sector. Is this a reasonable approach? Getting this question right is critical. In 1998, legal-person shareholding firms accountedfor 40 percent (11.3/28.9) of the purported private sector. Excluding these firms would reduce the share of the private sector in industrial value-addedfrom 28.9 percent in 1998 to only 17.6 percent (i.e., 28.9 percent minus 11.3 percent). For 2005, the private sector exclusive of legal-person shareholding firms would be 39.8 percent rather than 71.2 percent (i.e., 71.2 percent minus 31.4 percent). This is another illustration of a common refrain in this book – getting the details right matters.
Legal-person shareholding refers to cross-shareholding by firms. Probably because of the connotations of this term, the OECD economists might have assumed that legal-person shareholding implies that China has a keiretsu arrangement similar to that in Japan where firms own each others’ stocks. The difference with Japan, however, is that in China much of the legal-person share capital originates in the state sector, via SOEs establishing or holding significant equity stakes in other firms. These firms then become affiliates or subsidiaries of the SOEs. The subsidiaries of the SOEs, on account of their final ownership, are still SOEs.

Another well-known SOE on the list classified by the OECD study as private is SAIC Motor Corporation Limited (SAIC Motor). In the NBS dataset, the state share of SAIC Motor’s share capital structure is 0 percent; it is 70 percent legal-person shareholding and 30 percent individual shareholding. So this firm qualifies as a private firm in the OECD definition. But SAIC Motor is not even remotely a private firm. SAIC Motor was established in 1997; its predecessor was Shanghai Gear Factory. In 1997, 30 percent of the share capital was issued on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the rest of the share capital was held by Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), which is 100 percent owned by the Shanghai government. Because the Shanghai government owns SAIC Motor via SAIC – a legal-person shareholder – the state share capital is reduced to zero; however, from a control perspective, there is little question about who controls this firm.
The example of SAIC Motor also illustrates the nature of the SOE reforms in the 1990s. Much of the reform effort had nothing to do with actually changing the owners of the firms but rather it was directed at securitizing the full but previously implicit equity holdings of the state in the SOEs. Although these reform measures copy the superficial forms of a capitalistic market economy, none of them has anything to do with its essence – transferring corporate control from government to private investors.
The high concentration of the ownership structure of the legal-person shareholding firms is another sign that these firms are not private at all. In the NBS dataset, SAIC Motor has the most dispersed shareholding structure among the legal-person shareholding firms because 30 percent of its shares are held by individual shareholders. (This is because the firm is listed.) In contrast, of 16,871 legal-person shareholding firms in the NBS dataset for 1998, 75 percent have zero individual share capital. The average individual share capital is only 3.7 percent. This is entirely expected given the heavily accounting nature of the SOE reforms. As evidence, 7,612 of these so-called legal-person shareholding firms are actually factories – they are simply production subsidiaries of other SOEs. This explains the extraordinary concentration of ownership and control of these firms.

A view focusing on the control-right problems of the SOEs ought to have led to the next logical step of contract reforms – management buyouts of the SOEs. But, in the early 1990s, the Chinese leaders reversed the policy on the grounds that the contract reforms did not work. Instead, they embraced an industrial policy approach that actually augmented the control rights of those SOEs that the government had decided to retain. In the 1980s, collective TVEs, such as Kelon, had state revenue rights but private control rights. In the 1990s, in the case of the large SOEs, the situation was completely reversed. Most of the large SOEs, which were listed on China’s two stock exchanges, had partial private revenue rights but complete state control rights.
Between 1990 and 2003, only 6.97 percent of the initial public offerings on the two Chinese stock exchanges were from private-sector companies. The rest were SOEs that issued minority shares but in which managerial control remained very clearly in state hands.27 Put differently, because many shareholding firms in China have private revenue rights but their control rights still rest with the government, they should be considered as state-controlled. According to a detailed study of more than 600 firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 1995, the three main groups of shareholders – state, legal persons, and individual shareholders – each controlled about 30 percent of the outstanding shares (Xu and Wang 1997). This stock split has remained more or less constant since then, although the government has plans to reduce the state shares. The control rights of these firms were overwhelmingly state. According to the same study, although individual shareholding constituted 30 percent of the outstanding shares, on average individual shareholders occupied less than 0.3 percent of the seats on the boards of 154 companies, whereas on average the state was over-represented on the boards. On average, the state retained 50 percent of the seats even though its equity shares amounted to 30 percent. There were no proxy voting procedures, thereby putting the individual shareholders in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the institutional investors such as the government agencies. This usurpation of rightful shareholder power is direct evidence that the state harbors no intention of relinquishing its control rights even over those firms that have explicitly private revenue rights.
What does this mean? The mixed ownership corporate enterprises that emerged in China in recent decades are still to a large extent controlled by the state and should be considered to be a part of the public sector. This has considerable implications for what is being discussed at hand. In Chinese statistics, the nonstate sector includes these mixed ownership firms. Thus by making the huge mistake of conflating "nonstate" with "private," analysts mistakenly place mixed ownership firms into the private sector. However, this can be corrected and we come up with the following conclusion instead.
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/17/chinas-soe-sector-is-bigger-than-some-would-have-us-think/
The results of forcing such a choice are illustrative. With non-wholly state-funded LLCs included, the public share of fixed investment in the first quarter of 2016 is near 60 per cent. Data from 2013 show the public sector still accounting for only 30 per cent of total firms but roughly 55 per cent of assets, 45 per cent of revenue and 40 per cent of profits.

Those who claim private leadership can say that non-wholly state-funded LLCs are not the same as SOEs. The stronger point is that even some pure SOEs are qualitatively different than they were 20 years ago. But it is a large and mistaken jump from these correct observations to treating mixed or ‘non-state’ as equivalent to private, which Xinhua and many other observers frequently do. The non-traditional-SOE sector may account for 60 per cent of GDP; the private sector does not.
These numbers show that the public sector still maintains its dominance in its contribution GDP and investment.
However, the question still lingers whether contributions to GDP, investment, revenue, etc are accurate in making deductions about the ownership structures in an economy. Chinese economists propose that assets are the most important indicator to evaluate the status of any form of ownership, especially public ownership, in the national economy.
There is strong theoretical reasoning to prove this as well.
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-13-6895-0
Actually, to rely on assets to evaluate the dominant status of public ownership does not only meet the requirement of government policies, but is also deeply rooted in economic theories as well. Classical Marxian economists usually referred to the concept of “property right” when talking about ownership, i.e., the ownership of material production. For example, Marx, when making discussions on the basic features of the new, future society, spoke of the society as “collectively-owned, based on common ownership of the means of production”. Such a concept of ownership of the means of material production had been long in use, which was associated with the social background before the 1950s when various non-material means of production (such as various intangible assets, trademarks, marketing network, computer software and science and technologies) had not been common or important in social production. With technological advances and changes in the means of capitalist production, the various non-material modes became more and more important in the establishment of the capitalist relation of production. Therefore, the denotation and connotations of ownership became richer and richer. For example, some international enterprises originating in developed countries now make use of their advantages in product brands and supply chains to organize international production with little or no reliance on the share of capital investment in their hands; nor do they have to build any facility physically for material production. As a matter of fact, Marx seemed to have foreseen this as he sometimes talked about ownership with vague denotation and used such poorly-defined terms as “external conditions of labor”: “Any way to distribute consumer materials is just the distribution of the productive condition itself… Since the factors of production have to be distributed this way, the distribution of consumer materials has to go this way, too.” Here he did not mention the concept of means of production, but “productive condition” and “factors of production” that had an even wider range of connotations.
Using assets to evaluate the position of public ownership in the Chinese economy, we come to the conclusion that public ownership maintains its dominance.
Public ownership as the dominant form is supported by data. By the end of 2012, the total amount of the operating assets of China’s thrice industries was 487.53 trillion yuan (including the assets of individually-owned businesses), among which 53%, or 258.39 trillion yuan, was owned by the public sector. These data showed that, even with the strictest measurement, public ownership was still the dominant form of the national economy in China, and from the perspective of the ownership structure, the socialist nature of the Chinese society did not change; nor did the reforms change the color of the society. As a matter of fact, the socialist nature of our country also decides that the size of the nonoperating assets of the public sector is also considerable. When the nonoperating assets were included, the total amount of the assets of the Chinese society would be 518.13 trillion yuan (excluding the noncultivated undeveloped resource assets), among which the public owned 288.99 trillion yuan, or 55.78%. The national asset and its size are the externalized cost for efficiency improvement in the operational fields, in which the efficiency of enterprises relies heavily on such social support. Therefore, inspection on the ownership structure of the economy cannot ignore the nonoperating assets.
Now the question is, does this conclusion about the year 2012 apply currently to the year 2020? The answer is a yes.
In terms of the long-term trend, the dominant status of China’s public ownership is guaranteed. First, starting from 2009, the reforms on the ownership structure in China took a turn from rapid changes to fine adjustments. In the first phase (2004–2008), the proportion of public ownership, measured by asset, in the secondary and tertiary industries decreased from 62.73 to 55.48%, while the proportion of the nonpublic ownership increased from 37.27 to 44.52%. In the second phase (2009–2012), however, the proportion of public ownership decreased from 54.32 to 50.44%, and that of the nonpublic, from 45.68 to 49.56%. The numbers showed that the reforms on the ownership structure in China had progressed from wide-range and large-scale changes to a stable phase of fine adjustments. The assets of the public and nonpublic sectors have drawn to stabilization, which suggests that the dominating status of the public sector, measured by asset, will not change in the long-term trend, and the economic system that is based on the dominance of public ownership has been stabilized. Second, the strategic reorganization of SOEs and the public investment used in the state macro-adjustments will continue to accumulate new assets for the publicly-owned economy, which ensures the growth in quantity of both the publicly- and the non-publicly-owned economies. With public ownership as the dominant form, as long as the publicly-owned assets do not increase at a much slower speed than the non-publicly-owned, there is no question for public ownership to remain dominant.
If one needs more quantitative evidence to prove that ownership structure has been stable recently, one need not look further than the Chinese statistical yearbooks, which provide us continuous data on publicly owned assets (but note that this data only is on the industrial sector and leaves out the primary and tertiary sectors).
I made a spreadsheet here which has data from the Chinese statistical yearbooks on the ratio of state owned assets to total assets over time (from 2004 to 2018).
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1eUUMr_sUJxo8ZCRwodsXAQVtjVgv4Vity2ACpe01cCA/edit?usp=sharing
The data obviously shows that, just as the authors of the book predicted, the ownership adjustments in the Chinese economy have been very small and have largely stabilized with no further retreat of the public sector occuring. Thus we can still conclude that the public sector still maintains its dominance in China.
The Chinese statistical yearbooks can be found here:
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/
What I find interesting however is that the authors in the book I quoted from earlier come to the conclusion that the public sector makes up only 35% of output and 25% of employment in the secondary and tertiary industries, which may run counter to Derek Scissors’s claims about the larger contribution of the public sector in GDP, investment, etc. Whatever the case, the point still stands that by using assets as the main indicator, the Chinese public sector still maintains its dominance in the Chinese economy.
How does the position of the Chinese public sector compare to the capitalist countries?
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943
First, the publicly-owned assets in China have a higher share. In the secondary and tertiary industries only in 2012, the publicly-owned economic assets reached 226 trillion yuan in China and, according to the study on China’s sovereign assets and liabilities by Li Yang, et al.,10 the non-operating assets (excluding state land resources) reached 30.7 trillion yuan in 2010. The two together accounted for 53.62% of the total assets of the secondary and tertiary industries. In contrast, in the national balance sheet of the U.K., the share of the public sectors is as low as negligible: before the global financial crisis, the net assets of the U.K.’s public departments accounted for 6% of its total assets while in 2010, the percentage was 0 (Appendix Table 24). Similarly, the U.S. owned a total of 2.7 trillion dollar assets according to the national balance sheet of 2011 published by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Appendix Table 25) while the total assets owned by the U.S. residents and non-profit organizations reached 71 trillion dollars at the same times, giving the government assets a share of only 3.7% (Appendix Table 26). Canada has the same story in that its public sectors owned 2.4% of the total assets of its national economy in 2008 (Appendix Table 27). Germany, as the largest economy in Europe, was once considered to have one of the largest shares of SOEs, but the total assets of its state departments plunged in share, from 1.9% in 2007 to 0.1% in 2011 (Appendix Table 28), and all of its SOEs had a collective amount of assets that did not exceed 100 billion euro.11 Even when we took a round number of 100 billion, the total stateowned assets in Germany was still less than 1.3 trillion euro. The story is somewhat different for the catching-up countries such as Japan and South Korea in that they have relatively higher shares of publicly-owned assets. In Japan, for example, the total assets of public departments had a rapid decrease in share from 8.6% in 2007 to 2.6% in 2011 after the global financial crisis. Meanwhile, South Korea has always managed a high share of publicly-owned assets, which was 18.6% in 2011 (Appendix Table 29). Evidently, we have a much higher share of publicly-owned assets in China compared to capitalist countries, especially when compared to the public departments of the developed capitalist countries.
Even compared to the supposedly "mixed" or "state capitalist" economies of East Asia, publicly owned assets in China are a much larger share of the total than are present in Japan or South Korea, thus affirming the socialist (rather than “state capitalist”) nature of the Chinese economy.
One final question remains however: where is the Chinese economy headed in the next few decades?
The answer can be found in mixed ownership reform. Today, Chinese firms are reorganizing into mixed ownership firms where public sector and private sector firms are intermeshed and the divisions between them are blurred. One thing to note however is that the state will still maintain its dominance in these mixed ownership firms. This can be seen in the asset composition of mixed ownership firms.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02529203.2014.999905
In the absence of precise data on the different ownership components of corporate enterprises, we can only disaggregate their public and non-public components internally. The data from Yang Xinming and Yang Xuechun’s measurement of the total assets of the mixed ownership economy in 2008 indicate that the public and the private component account for 65 and 35 percent of the total respectively. After calculating the paid-in capital structure from the 2004 census data, we find that the public and private components accounted for 63 and 37 percent of the total respectively, as shown in Table 8. We therefore estimate the proportion of public assets in the total mixed ownership economy to have been 63 percent in 2004-2007 and 65 percent in 2008 and beyond.

Secondly, as indicated in Table 7, the assets of the mixed ownership economy represented by corporate enterprises have been growing extremely fast and are the largest in terms of scale. In 2012, this sector’s assets accounted for 51.8 percent of total productive assets in secondary and tertiary industry, ahead of all other types of enterprises; moreover, the sector is one in which the state-owned economic component is dominant. These data and this analysis offer an empirical basis for the arrangements for deepening reform set out in the Decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CCCPC, which notes that the mixed economy is an important means of realizing the basic economic system and is conducive to amplifying the role of state-owned capital and strengthening the dynamism, control and influence of the state-owned economy.
What the Chinese leadership seeks now is the mutual development of both the public and private sectors in mixed ownership enterprises instead of one sector developing at the expense of the other.
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943
Public ownership that dominates the asset structure is very tolerant of the non-publicly-owned economy. The dominating status of the publicly-owned assets provides material support for and is fundamental to China’s socialist ownership, underlies realization of common prosperity, offers a carrier for social functions to operate and, at the same time, strongly propels the development of the non-publicly-owned economy. In fact, the dominating status of the non-publicly-owned economy in output, employment, and taxation is the premise of its existence and development. According to our estimation, among the secondary and tertiary industries in China in 2012, the proportions of added value of the non-publicly- and publicly-owned economies were 67.59 and 32.41%, respectively, and new employment, 75.20 and 24.80%, respectively. Meanwhile, the businesses in the primary industry, such as agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery, are mostly comprised of family-based ones. Such development of both publicly- and non-publicly-owned economies with their respective status in asset size not matching their corresponding contributions is determined by their distinctive distributions across economic areas, and it also meets the demand of efficiency by the dominating market and by the external economics. Therefore, the domination in asset size by the publicly-owned economy together with the dominating contributions to output and employment made by the non-publicly-owned economy must stand side by side and march forward together. This is the foundation in practice for the “two unswervinglies” policy
In addition:
In addition, with further adjustments of the ownership structure, the dislocation of the domination in asset size of the public sector and the domination in economic contributions of the nonpublic sector will only be furthered. Actually, only with its rapid development can the nonpublic sector fulfill its role as an indispensable part to the socialist market economy, which will further drive SOEs to improve their efficiency so that mutual development will be achieved; and only with complete fusion of the two sectors brought by further improvement of the production efficiency and socialization of them can the primary stage of socialism has a chance to march to a higher stage.
In other words, the current mixed ownership reforms are setting up a huge building block for socialist China to step into a higher stage of socialism, bringing it closer to communism. So when you see articles like these from CGTN, please do not worry! Opening the “commanding heights” of the economy to private/foreign investment and competition is only a measure to further mixed ownership reforms and will not challenge the dominance of public ownership in the Chinese economy.
https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-18/China-unveils-guideline-on-improving-the-socialist-market-economy-QB6Vn3GVbO/index.html
There is a lot more Marxist theoretical backing for mixed ownership reform, but considering the size of this post, the theory behind the mixed ownership reforms will probably have to be something to write for another post.
Anyway, I’ll still leave behind some readings that will be useful to understand the combination of the public sector and market and the intermeshment of the public and private sectors in the Chinese economy to those who are curious.
https://stalinsmoustache.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/chapter-4-chinas-socialist-market-economy-pre-publication.pdf
https://stalinsmoustache.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/not-some-other-ism-06-pre-publication.pdf
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811327261 (chapter 1)
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943 (start at page 183)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CPE-10-2018-011/full/html
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CPE-04-2019-0006/full/html
https://philpapers.org/rec/BOEISA-2
I also HIGHLY RECOMMEND reading the articles in the following two journals (using scihub to get past the paywalls):
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rssc20
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rict20
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COVID-19 Updates: Food Processing Edition

Hello everyone! I got a few encouraging replies about a food processing specific thread, so I figured I'd give it a shot. I more than welcome anyone outside of the meat processing realm to provide any updates they might have (since my career is within the meat processing world, some of my links will be more meat focused.) Bear with me, as this is my first mega post!
I'll try to include industry links and mainstream news links. If there's anything that has a paywall, leave me a comment and I can post a TL;DR version! A lot of what I'm finding will be US specific, but I'll try to include international news as I see it. Also, if there are repeats of things found throughout supplychain, I apologize.
If you are in the US and are looking for a local source for meat, please check out the AAMP website and find your state's affiliate site. Many of the state websites have "find a butcher" lists or are providing updates on their social media with any of their members who have product on the shelves or space available in their slaughter schedule.
First up, quick resources for finding updates on plant closures:
FoodDive - Food & Bev Plant Closures (this is probably the most thorough list of closures I've found. FoodDive includes status, plant type, closure/reopening date, and reason for closure. They also include various links to news articles about the plant in question.)
MEAT+POULTRY - Meat Processing Closure Map
The Counter - Meat Processing
Meat industry news:
Three USDA inspectors have died due to COVID-19. As of earlier this month, 197 field inspectors were absent from work and another 120 were under self-quarantine. **Note: the USDA reports that there are 8,000 inspectors in 6,200 plants across the US. It doesn't look like the USDA website with this information has been updated since 2013 though.
To make matters worse, federal inspectors have been raising concerns about lack of transparency surrounding the safety at processing plants and say local leaders are withholding information related to the spread at COVID-19 at facilities. Last month during a tele-town hall, FSIS told inspectors they would need to find their own masks if the plants they were stationed at weren't supplying them and have now stopped taking employees questions during these town halls.
Keeping with inspector news, 40 CFIA inspectors throughout Canada have tested positive for COVID-19. Mentioned in this article is the fact that there are 37 CFIA inspectors stationed at Cargill's beef operation in High River, Alberta - 18 of them have tested positive. There have been 3 deaths of Cargill - High River employees and at least 1,500 positive cases in the area that are linked to this facility. Cargill reopened this facility last week, but was forced to close their Chambly, Quebec location this week after 64 workers tested positive..
US COVID-19 hot spots linked to meat packing plants. Take the state of Kansas, where there have been 8,340 confirmed cases as of this post. In Kansas, these spikes in positive cases are thanks to a massive effort by Gov. Kelly and the KSDH to get these plant employees tested as quickly as possible. Take a look at these counties (these 4 plants represent 25% of US beef production):
Millions of pigs to be euthanized. There have been a few other posts where I and others have touched on why the pork industry is impacted much more significantly than beef. With the short life cycle of a market pig coupled with the mass amount of pigs that are processed a day, there isn't much the producers can do to adjust what's happening with such short notice.
JBS USA CEO tells Wall Street Journal the pandemic will slow meat production in America for several months.
I'm trying to find more information on if this is happening in other states, but the Mississippi Dept. of Agriculture has changed rules on how farmers can sell meat products. This is cutting out the retail portion of the process and is linking up consumers directly with the farmer and their processors.
To make things more interesting, the USDA has announced they will be investigating pricing in the beef industry. This technically started late last year, but with all that has being going on recently, calls from ranchers, politicians, and various lobby groups have increased. There could be some anti-trust violations, if the allegations are true. There is also an ongoing lawsuit for fixing of pork prices.
Story from Waterloo, IA where a Tyson plant has reopened from an employee who recovered from COVID-19. If you're curious about what plants are implementing to keep employees separated, there is some footage. (Side note: we have suppliers reaching out to ask if we would like to buy curtain-like material, since it's cheaper than Plexiglas, to sell to our customers.)
Companies increasing pay, rolling out bonus programs, but employees still don't feel safe. I can't blame employees for feeling this way when I know how difficult it is for me to get things like masks and disposable gloves. Now, we have to compete with business reopening who are telling their customers every employee will have a mask and gloves on during interactions. A brief interview about the current situation in the disposable glove marketplace - takeaway is flexibility is key, if that's even an option. Just today, JBS and Pilgrims Pride announced they will invest more than $50 million into the communities of their employees. This will include donations to alleviate food insecurity, improve infrastructure and employee well-being, and support COVID-19 emergency response/relief efforts.
Other food news:
April saw the sharpest rise in grocery prices in 50 years.
Flour mills are struggling to get packaging to keep up with demand. This article mentions a mill in upstate New York that is running 18 hours a day to keep up. There's another story from a few weeks ago that King Arthur's flour sales increased more than 2,000% in March alone. This comes with the USDA forecasting world record wheat supply and use for 2020-2021.
Driscoll worries the market for berries 'just is not there' amid pandemic.
Onion growers requesting $16 million in direct aid. The National Onion Association has requested that the USDA pay assistance money directly to onion growers in the amount of $5 per 50 pound unit for farmers who have documentation of dumped crops due to lack of market or no other viable options retroactive to March 16th, are currently dumping onions, or are donating onions for use as livestock feed or to food banks.
US food service distributors feeling COVID-19 pain.
What does Momofuku closing locations mean for the rest of the restaurant industry? Interesting write up about what high-end restaurants with billionaire investors closing means for everyone else. Eater has been actively providing updates on COVID-19's impact on the restaurant industry (in the US and UK) if anyone is interested.
Impossible Foods founder wants to re-purpose the meat supply chain for plant-based meat. CEO Patrick Brown has described slaughter facilities as "a feces-ridden public health hazard", but he believes the labor and equipment can be repurposed to support the plant-based meat market in the face of extended closures and wanting to eliminate the meat supply chain.
submitted by heavyonthesos67 to supplychain [link] [comments]

The Dominance of Public Ownership in the Chinese Socialist Market Economy

There are many that seem to believe that China today is a capitalist country, and that ever since 1978, China took the capitalist road. The relative decline of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in China in comparison to the private sector is used as damning evidence in favor of this view.
I will take this article for example:
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/why-chinas-state-owned-companies-still-have-a-key-role-to-play/
China’s private sector - which has been revving up since the global financial crisis - is now serving as the main driver of China’s economic growth. The combination of numbers 60/70/80/90 are frequently used to describe the private sector's contribution to the Chinese economy: they contribute 60% of China’s GDP, and are responsible for 70% of innovation, 80% of urban employment and provide 90% of new jobs. Private wealth is also responsible for 70% of investment and 90% of exports.
All of this is seemingly supported by official Chinese data AT FIRST GLANCE.
Taking a closer look, there may be problems in this combination of numbers. While China’s ownership structure has changed dramatically since reform began, claims that the private sector now dominates the economy may be exaggerated.
This comes from a misunderstanding of the use of the terms "state" and "nonstate" in Chinese official statistics.
https://www.heritage.org/testimony/chinese-state-owned-enterprises-and-us-china-economic-relations
The discussion of SOEs has been undermined by a fundamental error: the conflation of restructured, share-holding firms with the truly private sector. Share-holding SOEs are manifestly not private actors and assessments of the corporate sector that assume so are fatally flawed from the outset. The origin of this mistake is historical. As quasi-state entities emerged and proliferated, it was clear some sort of separate treatment was necessary and the concept of “non-state” was created. This was never intended to indicate “private”—quite the opposite: it was meant to signify that the creation of corporate forms quite different from SOEs could occur without privatization and its ideological pitfalls.
The meaning of “non-state” is very well understood by the Chinese government. The (sometimes willful) misunderstanding outside China rests on two shaky pillars. The first is a mis-rendering of “non-state”—where the PRC sees the opposite of state as non-state, many foreign observers see the opposite of state as “private” and simply re-label accordingly. The second is more sophisticated and based on the share-holding change.
Neither specification of share-holders nor sale of stock by itself does anything to alter state control. The large majority of firms listed on domestic stock markets are specifically designated as state-owned. The sale of small minority stakes on foreign exchanges could be construed as recasting mainstays such as CNPC (through its list vehicle PetroChina), China Mobile, and Chinalco as non-state entities of some form. However, they are still centrally directed SOEs, as explicitly indicated by the Chinese government.
Derek Scissors’s claim (the author of the article I am quoting) also has the support of empirical evidence as well.
https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-why-chinese-stocks-are-a-state-controlled-facade-2010-6
Even after the enactment of the non-tradable share reform in 2005, the free- float ratio of China A shares remains the lowest in Asia (Exhibit 27).
The State-owned Asset and Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is the government entity charged with holding and administering the large state-owned positions. These shares were classified as non-tradable until 2005, when the non-tradable share reform gave share dividends to free-float shareholders in exchange for making the government-held shares tradable (but with certain constraints). Over time, we believe that the SASAC will continue to sell down these holdings on the margin, while keeping the bulk of the shares.
Thus the control and ownership that U.S. share ownership represents is completely different than what Chinese share ownership represents. Simply put, Chinese shares don't translate into effective ownership of their underlying companies.
https://books.google.com/books/about/Capitalism_with_Chinese_Characteristics.html?id=YBpih2Q1X9kC&source=kp_book_description
The OECD economists assign the entire output by legal-person shareholding firms to the private sector. Is this a reasonable approach? Getting this question right is critical. In 1998, legal-person shareholding firms accountedfor 40 percent (11.3/28.9) of the purported private sector. Excluding these firms would reduce the share of the private sector in industrial value-addedfrom 28.9 percent in 1998 to only 17.6 percent (i.e., 28.9 percent minus 11.3 percent). For 2005, the private sector exclusive of legal-person shareholding firms would be 39.8 percent rather than 71.2 percent (i.e., 71.2 percent minus 31.4 percent). This is another illustration of a common refrain in this book – getting the details right matters.
Legal-person shareholding refers to cross-shareholding by firms. Probably because of the connotations of this term, the OECD economists might have assumed that legal-person shareholding implies that China has a keiretsu arrangement similar to that in Japan where firms own each others’ stocks. The difference with Japan, however, is that in China much of the legal-person share capital originates in the state sector, via SOEs establishing or holding significant equity stakes in other firms. These firms then become affiliates or subsidiaries of the SOEs. The subsidiaries of the SOEs, on account of their final ownership, are still SOEs.

Another well-known SOE on the list classified by the OECD study as private is SAIC Motor Corporation Limited (SAIC Motor). In the NBS dataset, the state share of SAIC Motor’s share capital structure is 0 percent; it is 70 percent legal-person shareholding and 30 percent individual shareholding. So this firm qualifies as a private firm in the OECD definition. But SAIC Motor is not even remotely a private firm. SAIC Motor was established in 1997; its predecessor was Shanghai Gear Factory. In 1997, 30 percent of the share capital was issued on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the rest of the share capital was held by Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), which is 100 percent owned by the Shanghai government. Because the Shanghai government owns SAIC Motor via SAIC – a legal-person shareholder – the state share capital is reduced to zero; however, from a control perspective, there is little question about who controls this firm.
The example of SAIC Motor also illustrates the nature of the SOE reforms in the 1990s. Much of the reform effort had nothing to do with actually changing the owners of the firms but rather it was directed at securitizing the full but previously implicit equity holdings of the state in the SOEs. Although these reform measures copy the superficial forms of a capitalistic market economy, none of them has anything to do with its essence – transferring corporate control from government to private investors.
The high concentration of the ownership structure of the legal-person shareholding firms is another sign that these firms are not private at all. In the NBS dataset, SAIC Motor has the most dispersed shareholding structure among the legal-person shareholding firms because 30 percent of its shares are held by individual shareholders. (This is because the firm is listed.) In contrast, of 16,871 legal-person shareholding firms in the NBS dataset for 1998, 75 percent have zero individual share capital. The average individual share capital is only 3.7 percent. This is entirely expected given the heavily accounting nature of the SOE reforms. As evidence, 7,612 of these so-called legal-person shareholding firms are actually factories – they are simply production subsidiaries of other SOEs. This explains the extraordinary concentration of ownership and control of these firms.

A view focusing on the control-right problems of the SOEs ought to have led to the next logical step of contract reforms – management buyouts of the SOEs. But, in the early 1990s, the Chinese leaders reversed the policy on the grounds that the contract reforms did not work. Instead, they embraced an industrial policy approach that actually augmented the control rights of those SOEs that the government had decided to retain. In the 1980s, collective TVEs, such as Kelon, had state revenue rights but private control rights. In the 1990s, in the case of the large SOEs, the situation was completely reversed. Most of the large SOEs, which were listed on China’s two stock exchanges, had partial private revenue rights but complete state control rights.
Between 1990 and 2003, only 6.97 percent of the initial public offerings on the two Chinese stock exchanges were from private-sector companies. The rest were SOEs that issued minority shares but in which managerial control remained very clearly in state hands.27 Put differently, because many shareholding firms in China have private revenue rights but their control rights still rest with the government, they should be considered as state-controlled. According to a detailed study of more than 600 firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 1995, the three main groups of shareholders – state, legal persons, and individual shareholders – each controlled about 30 percent of the outstanding shares (Xu and Wang 1997). This stock split has remained more or less constant since then, although the government has plans to reduce the state shares. The control rights of these firms were overwhelmingly state. According to the same study, although individual shareholding constituted 30 percent of the outstanding shares, on average individual shareholders occupied less than 0.3 percent of the seats on the boards of 154 companies, whereas on average the state was over-represented on the boards. On average, the state retained 50 percent of the seats even though its equity shares amounted to 30 percent. There were no proxy voting procedures, thereby putting the individual shareholders in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the institutional investors such as the government agencies. This usurpation of rightful shareholder power is direct evidence that the state harbors no intention of relinquishing its control rights even over those firms that have explicitly private revenue rights.
What does this mean? The mixed ownership corporate enterprises that emerged in China in recent decades are still to a large extent controlled by the state and should be considered to be a part of the public sector. This has considerable implications for what is being discussed at hand. In Chinese statistics, the nonstate sector includes these mixed ownership firms. Thus by making the huge mistake of conflating "nonstate" with "private," analysts mistakenly place mixed ownership firms into the private sector. However, this can be corrected and we come up with the following conclusion instead.
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/17/chinas-soe-sector-is-bigger-than-some-would-have-us-think/
The results of forcing such a choice are illustrative. With non-wholly state-funded LLCs included, the public share of fixed investment in the first quarter of 2016 is near 60 per cent. Data from 2013 show the public sector still accounting for only 30 per cent of total firms but roughly 55 per cent of assets, 45 per cent of revenue and 40 per cent of profits.

Those who claim private leadership can say that non-wholly state-funded LLCs are not the same as SOEs. The stronger point is that even some pure SOEs are qualitatively different than they were 20 years ago. But it is a large and mistaken jump from these correct observations to treating mixed or ‘non-state’ as equivalent to private, which Xinhua and many other observers frequently do. The non-traditional-SOE sector may account for 60 per cent of GDP; the private sector does not.
These numbers show that the public sector still maintains its dominance in its contribution GDP and investment.
However, the question still lingers whether contributions to GDP, investment, revenue, etc are accurate in making deductions about the ownership structures in an economy. Chinese economists propose that assets are the most important indicator to evaluate the status of any form of ownership, especially public ownership, in the national economy.
There is strong theoretical reasoning to prove this as well.
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-13-6895-0
Actually, to rely on assets to evaluate the dominant status of public ownership does not only meet the requirement of government policies, but is also deeply rooted in economic theories as well. Classical Marxian economists usually referred to the concept of “property right” when talking about ownership, i.e., the ownership of material production. For example, Marx, when making discussions on the basic features of the new, future society, spoke of the society as “collectively-owned, based on common ownership of the means of production”. Such a concept of ownership of the means of material production had been long in use, which was associated with the social background before the 1950s when various non-material means of production (such as various intangible assets, trademarks, marketing network, computer software and science and technologies) had not been common or important in social production. With technological advances and changes in the means of capitalist production, the various non-material modes became more and more important in the establishment of the capitalist relation of production. Therefore, the denotation and connotations of ownership became richer and richer. For example, some international enterprises originating in developed countries now make use of their advantages in product brands and supply chains to organize international production with little or no reliance on the share of capital investment in their hands; nor do they have to build any facility physically for material production. As a matter of fact, Marx seemed to have foreseen this as he sometimes talked about ownership with vague denotation and used such poorly-defined terms as “external conditions of labor”: “Any way to distribute consumer materials is just the distribution of the productive condition itself… Since the factors of production have to be distributed this way, the distribution of consumer materials has to go this way, too.” Here he did not mention the concept of means of production, but “productive condition” and “factors of production” that had an even wider range of connotations.
Using assets to evaluate the position of public ownership in the Chinese economy, we come to the conclusion that public ownership maintains its dominance.
Public ownership as the dominant form is supported by data. By the end of 2012, the total amount of the operating assets of China’s thrice industries was 487.53 trillion yuan (including the assets of individually-owned businesses), among which 53%, or 258.39 trillion yuan, was owned by the public sector. These data showed that, even with the strictest measurement, public ownership was still the dominant form of the national economy in China, and from the perspective of the ownership structure, the socialist nature of the Chinese society did not change; nor did the reforms change the color of the society. As a matter of fact, the socialist nature of our country also decides that the size of the nonoperating assets of the public sector is also considerable. When the nonoperating assets were included, the total amount of the assets of the Chinese society would be 518.13 trillion yuan (excluding the noncultivated undeveloped resource assets), among which the public owned 288.99 trillion yuan, or 55.78%. The national asset and its size are the externalized cost for efficiency improvement in the operational fields, in which the efficiency of enterprises relies heavily on such social support. Therefore, inspection on the ownership structure of the economy cannot ignore the nonoperating assets.
Now the question is, does this conclusion about the year 2012 apply currently to the year 2020? The answer is a yes.
In terms of the long-term trend, the dominant status of China’s public ownership is guaranteed. First, starting from 2009, the reforms on the ownership structure in China took a turn from rapid changes to fine adjustments. In the first phase (2004–2008), the proportion of public ownership, measured by asset, in the secondary and tertiary industries decreased from 62.73 to 55.48%, while the proportion of the nonpublic ownership increased from 37.27 to 44.52%. In the second phase (2009–2012), however, the proportion of public ownership decreased from 54.32 to 50.44%, and that of the nonpublic, from 45.68 to 49.56%. The numbers showed that the reforms on the ownership structure in China had progressed from wide-range and large-scale changes to a stable phase of fine adjustments. The assets of the public and nonpublic sectors have drawn to stabilization, which suggests that the dominating status of the public sector, measured by asset, will not change in the long-term trend, and the economic system that is based on the dominance of public ownership has been stabilized. Second, the strategic reorganization of SOEs and the public investment used in the state macro-adjustments will continue to accumulate new assets for the publicly-owned economy, which ensures the growth in quantity of both the publicly- and the non-publicly-owned economies. With public ownership as the dominant form, as long as the publicly-owned assets do not increase at a much slower speed than the non-publicly-owned, there is no question for public ownership to remain dominant.
If one needs more quantitative evidence to prove that ownership structure has been stable recently, one need not look further than the Chinese statistical yearbooks, which provide us continuous data on publicly owned assets (but note that this data only is on the industrial sector and leaves out the primary and tertiary sectors).
I made a spreadsheet here which has data from the Chinese statistical yearbooks on the ratio of state owned assets to total assets over time (from 2004 to 2018).
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1eUUMr_sUJxo8ZCRwodsXAQVtjVgv4Vity2ACpe01cCA/edit?usp=sharing
The data obviously shows that, just as the authors of the book predicted, the ownership adjustments in the Chinese economy have been very small and have largely stabilized with no further retreat of the public sector occuring. Thus we can still conclude that the public sector still maintains its dominance in China.
The Chinese statistical yearbooks can be found here:
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/
What I find interesting however is that the authors in the book I quoted from earlier come to the conclusion that the public sector makes up only 35% of output and 25% of employment in the secondary and tertiary industries, which may run counter to Derek Scissors’s claims about the larger contribution of the public sector in GDP, investment, etc. Whatever the case, the point still stands that by using assets as the main indicator, the Chinese public sector still maintains its dominance in the Chinese economy.
How does the position of the Chinese public sector compare to the capitalist countries?
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943
First, the publicly-owned assets in China have a higher share. In the secondary and tertiary industries only in 2012, the publicly-owned economic assets reached 226 trillion yuan in China and, according to the study on China’s sovereign assets and liabilities by Li Yang, et al.,10 the non-operating assets (excluding state land resources) reached 30.7 trillion yuan in 2010. The two together accounted for 53.62% of the total assets of the secondary and tertiary industries. In contrast, in the national balance sheet of the U.K., the share of the public sectors is as low as negligible: before the global financial crisis, the net assets of the U.K.’s public departments accounted for 6% of its total assets while in 2010, the percentage was 0 (Appendix Table 24). Similarly, the U.S. owned a total of 2.7 trillion dollar assets according to the national balance sheet of 2011 published by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Appendix Table 25) while the total assets owned by the U.S. residents and non-profit organizations reached 71 trillion dollars at the same times, giving the government assets a share of only 3.7% (Appendix Table 26). Canada has the same story in that its public sectors owned 2.4% of the total assets of its national economy in 2008 (Appendix Table 27). Germany, as the largest economy in Europe, was once considered to have one of the largest shares of SOEs, but the total assets of its state departments plunged in share, from 1.9% in 2007 to 0.1% in 2011 (Appendix Table 28), and all of its SOEs had a collective amount of assets that did not exceed 100 billion euro.11 Even when we took a round number of 100 billion, the total stateowned assets in Germany was still less than 1.3 trillion euro. The story is somewhat different for the catching-up countries such as Japan and South Korea in that they have relatively higher shares of publicly-owned assets. In Japan, for example, the total assets of public departments had a rapid decrease in share from 8.6% in 2007 to 2.6% in 2011 after the global financial crisis. Meanwhile, South Korea has always managed a high share of publicly-owned assets, which was 18.6% in 2011 (Appendix Table 29). Evidently, we have a much higher share of publicly-owned assets in China compared to capitalist countries, especially when compared to the public departments of the developed capitalist countries.
Even compared to the supposedly "mixed" or "state capitalist" economies of East Asia, publicly owned assets in China are a much larger share of the total than are present in Japan or South Korea, thus affirming the socialist (rather than “state capitalist”) nature of the Chinese economy.
One final question remains however: where is the Chinese economy headed in the next few decades?
The answer can be found in mixed ownership reform. Today, Chinese firms are reorganizing into mixed ownership firms where public sector and private sector firms are intermeshed and the divisions between them are blurred. One thing to note however is that the state will still maintain its dominance in these mixed ownership firms. This can be seen in the asset composition of mixed ownership firms.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02529203.2014.999905
In the absence of precise data on the different ownership components of corporate enterprises, we can only disaggregate their public and non-public components internally. The data from Yang Xinming and Yang Xuechun’s measurement of the total assets of the mixed ownership economy in 2008 indicate that the public and the private component account for 65 and 35 percent of the total respectively. After calculating the paid-in capital structure from the 2004 census data, we find that the public and private components accounted for 63 and 37 percent of the total respectively, as shown in Table 8. We therefore estimate the proportion of public assets in the total mixed ownership economy to have been 63 percent in 2004-2007 and 65 percent in 2008 and beyond.

Secondly, as indicated in Table 7, the assets of the mixed ownership economy represented by corporate enterprises have been growing extremely fast and are the largest in terms of scale. In 2012, this sector’s assets accounted for 51.8 percent of total productive assets in secondary and tertiary industry, ahead of all other types of enterprises; moreover, the sector is one in which the state-owned economic component is dominant. These data and this analysis offer an empirical basis for the arrangements for deepening reform set out in the Decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CCCPC, which notes that the mixed economy is an important means of realizing the basic economic system and is conducive to amplifying the role of state-owned capital and strengthening the dynamism, control and influence of the state-owned economy.
What the Chinese leadership seeks now is the mutual development of both the public and private sectors in mixed ownership enterprises instead of one sector developing at the expense of the other.
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943
Public ownership that dominates the asset structure is very tolerant of the non-publicly-owned economy. The dominating status of the publicly-owned assets provides material support for and is fundamental to China’s socialist ownership, underlies realization of common prosperity, offers a carrier for social functions to operate and, at the same time, strongly propels the development of the non-publicly-owned economy. In fact, the dominating status of the non-publicly-owned economy in output, employment, and taxation is the premise of its existence and development. According to our estimation, among the secondary and tertiary industries in China in 2012, the proportions of added value of the non-publicly- and publicly-owned economies were 67.59 and 32.41%, respectively, and new employment, 75.20 and 24.80%, respectively. Meanwhile, the businesses in the primary industry, such as agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery, are mostly comprised of family-based ones. Such development of both publicly- and non-publicly-owned economies with their respective status in asset size not matching their corresponding contributions is determined by their distinctive distributions across economic areas, and it also meets the demand of efficiency by the dominating market and by the external economics. Therefore, the domination in asset size by the publicly-owned economy together with the dominating contributions to output and employment made by the non-publicly-owned economy must stand side by side and march forward together. This is the foundation in practice for the “two unswervinglies” policy
In addition:
In addition, with further adjustments of the ownership structure, the dislocation of the domination in asset size of the public sector and the domination in economic contributions of the nonpublic sector will only be furthered. Actually, only with its rapid development can the nonpublic sector fulfill its role as an indispensable part to the socialist market economy, which will further drive SOEs to improve their efficiency so that mutual development will be achieved; and only with complete fusion of the two sectors brought by further improvement of the production efficiency and socialization of them can the primary stage of socialism has a chance to march to a higher stage.
In other words, the current mixed ownership reforms are setting up a huge building block for socialist China to step into a higher stage of socialism, bringing it closer to communism. So when you see articles like these from CGTN, please do not worry! Opening the “commanding heights” of the economy to private/foreign investment and competition is only a measure to further mixed ownership reforms and will not challenge the dominance of public ownership in the Chinese economy.
https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-18/China-unveils-guideline-on-improving-the-socialist-market-economy-QB6Vn3GVbO/index.html
There is a lot more Marxist theoretical backing for mixed ownership reform, but considering the size of this post, the theory behind the mixed ownership reforms will probably have to be something to write for another post.
Anyway, I’ll still leave behind some readings that will be useful to understand the combination of the public sector and market and the intermeshment of the public and private sectors in the Chinese economy to those who are curious.
https://stalinsmoustache.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/chapter-4-chinas-socialist-market-economy-pre-publication.pdf
https://stalinsmoustache.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/not-some-other-ism-06-pre-publication.pdf
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811327261 (chapter 1)
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943 (start at page 183)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CPE-10-2018-011/full/html
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CPE-04-2019-0006/full/html
https://philpapers.org/rec/BOEISA-2
I also HIGHLY RECOMMEND reading the articles in the following two journals (using scihub to get past the paywalls):
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rssc20
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rict20
submitted by fortniteBot3000 to communism [link] [comments]

READ THIS FIRST: Official Frequently Asked Questions and Answers - Important Up to Date Information You Need To Know about EIDL

\*LAST UPDATED 7/14**)

OFFICIAL FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR EIDL


PURPOSE:
This post will be a master thread with everything we have collectively learned on EIDL about the loan and the application process. It will be updated on an ongoing basis and will always contain the most current information. Things change frequently at the SBA with policy and you should check back on this thread on a regular basis.
Please post any questions not covered and I will respond and add them here.

INDEX OF QUESTIONS:

  1. How do I get in touch with customer service phone support?
  2. What are my chances of being approved for this loan? Can I know in advance?
  3. I received a decline letter for “Business activity not eligible”. What can I do?
  4. How is the loan amount calculated? How can I request a specific amount?
  5. What is the maximum loan amount?
  6. When will I get my portal invite?
  7. I finally got a portal invite and accepted and submitted an amount. My application says it is "processing", now what?
  8. I understand that processing really means "underwriting", but how long will it actually take? What is the normal amount of time?
  9. Does contacting my congressmen or senator actually work?
  10. I accidentally entered the wrong revenue or COGS on my application and my offer amount was lower than I expected, is it possible to change this?
  11. I need to change my Rev or COGS and I already accepted an amount in the portal, Tier 2 told me to do it! Is it too late?
  12. Who are you, cue378? Can you help me?
  13. My loan as obligated or already funded, I made a mistake with my COGS or revenue and I am not happy with the amount. Can I change it?
  14. How do I show support for the volunteers and moderators for EIDL
  15. I received my portal link, but when I go to create an account it just takes me to the login page. What can be done?
  16. I was declined for "unsatisfactory credit". What are my options?
  17. What documents are required? Will a loan officer contact me?
  18. What is the status of the Advance/Grant program? Can I still get a grant?
  19. What are the eligible uses of EIDL funds?
  20. I received a denial letter for the reason "ECONOMIC INJURY NOT SUSTAINED". What does this mean and what can I do?
  21. What is CAWEB and how can it help me track my loan disbursement and other status?
  22. I received my portal invite link, however when I go to create an account I just get the message: "The user account has not been confirmed yet. Please confirm using the link in the e-mail". What can I do?



1. QUESTION: How do I get in touch with customer service phone support?
ANSWER: The highest level of official customer service is known as "tier 2" and can be reached by calling 1-800-659-2955 and asking for Tier 2. (NOTE: As of 5/29 the previous direct number is currently out of service) They are unfortunately, a very limited means of support. They are able to check your application status and see the current "stage" and leave notes in your file, but unable to directly make any changes or escalate anything in a meaningful way.
Most are very nice and well meaning people but are usually poorly informed and often provided contradictory information between calls. The important thing to understand is that notes left by T2 do not actually notify a loan officer or anyone, they are simply waiting to be read if someone happens to open your file and takes the time to review the case notes. So if a T2 says they requested a change do not assume it was or will be made.


2. QUESTION: What are my chances of being approved for this loan? Can I know in advance?
ANSWER: The loan is relatively easy to get approval for by loan standards. The exact underwriting criteria the SBA is using was leaked by some helpful people (hat tip to u/Sbaleaky) and thus you can have a good understanding what your chances are.
Underwriters look for the following:
-Minimum Credit Score of 570. They will pull from experian. Close to Vantage 3 model found on nav DOT com or TransUnion numbers on credit karma. They do NOT use FICO. Credit score is largest factor for approval for this loan and no exceptions are made for under 570.
-If economic injury was sustained based on formula described in QUESTION 4. If this is a negative number you will be auto declined. (SEE QUESTION 5) The SBA does not consider potential revenue lost or general expenses in the loan amount.
-Tax liens or tax issues are NOT a disqualifying factor or taken into consideration for COVID19 disaster.
-Business start date must be prior to 1/31/20
-open bankruptcies = Declined. Closed OK.
-Arrest for felony < 5 years = Declined
-Arrest for misdemeanor < 5 years = Declined
-Sole proprietors with delinquent child support > 60 days = Declined
-Any business principals with 50% or more ownership with delinquent child support > 60 days = Declined
-Your business must pass verification in some way that it is a valid operation. If they can find it on google it will suffice. Otherwise you may have to provide documents to prove it's a legit business.
-Your business type must not be on the list for ineligible business activity. See list on FAQ.
-All owners on application must be either US citizens or Permanent Residents. E-2 Investor visa is NOT eligible and any attempts to appeal or add a co-borrower who is a citizen or LPR will be unsuccessful. Corporations, Partnerships, and Limited Liability Entities (LLE): Alien-owned corporations, partnerships, and LLEs properly registered and licensed in the state where the disaster occurred are eligible. If any member, partner, or shareholder, owning 20 percent or more of the applicant business is in the USA they must be a qualified alien. If the alien resides outside the USA an exception may be made.


3. QUESTION: I received a decline letter for “Business activity not eligible”. What can I do?
ANSWER: EIDL has a list of restricted business categories, if your type is NOT on this list and you still received this letter you may have been improperly classified.

The following applicants are not eligible for EIDL assistance.



4. QUESTION: How is the loan amount calculated? How can I request a specific amount?
ANSWER: There is no way to request a specific amount, the eligible amount is calculated automatically by formula based on your inputs. There are three known formulas:
  1. Standard Small Business: Revenue minus COGS divided by 2 minus advance, subject to maximum of 150K
  2. Not for Profit: 6 months operating expenses year prior to 1/31/20
  3. Business that collects rental property income, your offer is calculated by lost rents due to the disaster, not the standard formula. If your offer is lower than expected you may have been wrongly classified into this formula.
  4. Agricultural businesses: 6 months operating expenses year prior to 1/31/20
If the formula results in a negative number or less than your advance you will be declined for "ECONOMIC INJURY NOT SUSTAINED"

5. QUESTION: What is the maximum loan amount?
ANSWER: As of last update it is currently 150K cap. This will not change anytime soon and there will be no way to request more at present. The only way to avoid the cap is if your loan was already being obligated prior to the change by the SBA from 500K. If I hear anything new on this it will be updated here.

6. QUESTION: When will I get my portal invite?
ANSWER: Portal invites are a fully automated process and not strictly sequential but follow general group patterns. If you see someone that has a higher number than you get a portal invite it does NOT mean you were "passed over".

7. QUESTION: I finally got a portal invite and accepted and submitted an amount. My application says it is "processing", now what?
ANSWER: This is when the actual loan process starts and underwriting begins. Your application will be assigned a loan officer for review using the criteria listed in question 2. The exact process is as follows (hat tip u/sbaleaky and u/LOL_Face_69) with the actual stages from start to finish. Keep in mind that once you accept in the portal a number of things are going on behind the scenes, which is why "processing" can take a great deal of time. Once you see a loan amount in your portal, this is NOT an approved offer. It is simply a potential amount you are eligible for based on the stated formula if you pass underwriting.

[The following takes place behind the scenes and will not reflect in your portal, but will still say "processing"]
Note: The exception to this process is that some applications which are considered easy (based on unknown factors) to approve are subject to full automation and may go straight to approval bypassing the above steps. This only happens in rare cases.
You may also see a status that says, "On-Hold" Amount $0: This status typically is when your loan was temporarily declined and is still in the reconsideration department pending possible reconsideration approval.


8. QUESTION: I now understand that processing really means "underwriting", but how long will it actually take? What is the normal amount of time?
ANSWER: The amount of time it is normal for your portal to say "processing" is highly variable as a hundred different factors are involved behind the scenes. As of 6/10 we are seeing extended delays in processing time and obligating stage specifically. The average we are seeing is around 14-16 days total in processing. If your application has been in underwriting for greater than 14 days it may merit investigate, but not necessarily indicate a problem with your chances of approval. Do NOT panic if it seems "stuck" with no communication from anyone. This is normal.


9. QUESTION: Does contacting my congressmen or senator actually work?
ANSWER: Yes, the SBA treats congressional inquiry very carefully and will flag and sometimes white glove your application. Often they will assign a special case worker during the process. The important thing is when your local congressional office reaches out they do NOT contact the local district SBA but this email: [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]). This email is NOT for use by applicants but only official government purposes.


10. QUESTION: Help! I accidentally entered the wrong revenue or COGS on my application and my offer amount was lower than I expected, is it possible to change this?
ANSWER: Yes, but two factors are important:
  1. You should NOT have already accepted an amount and submitted for processing in the portal. *If you already did see note below.
  2. You have documentation to backup the changes such as Federal Tax Returns 2018 or 2019 or P&L Statements. Tax returns are strongly preferred if available.
****The important thing here is DO NOT accept the offer in the portal if you need to revise your numbers.****
*IF YOU HAVE ALREADY ACCEPTED THE OFFER: Call tier 2 support as soon as you possibly can and ask them to make the following note in your file: Loan Officer, DO NOT approve this file without calling me, the applicant, because my (revenue or COGS) figures are wrong. I have supporting docs to make the changes. Please contact me ASAP.
If you meet the above two criteria contact me via email at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) with your Reddit username in the subject and put COGS REVISION REQUESTED in the subject line. I will respond and give you private advice on the matter.


11. QUESTION: I need to change my Rev or COGS and I already accepted an amount in the portal, Tier 2 told me to do it! Is it too late?
Answer: Unfortunately tier 2 is currently giving absolutely terrible advice in this situation. They are telling people to accept the offer in the portal to speak with a loan officer to make the revision. The problem is that once you accept you set the process in motion and then it gets obligated by treasury it is impossible to adjust. The proper time is prior to accepting. Often times loan officers never are needed, never reach out or even read these notes. I see it every day and people are stuck its the "kiss of death" advice. If you already accepted you may have time but would need to work quickly from date of submit.
UPDATE: As of 6/15 there is now a way to fix this. See question 13.

12. QUESTION: Who are you, cue378? Can you help me?
ANSWER: I am a small business owner who is a full time volunteer offering to assist in the EIDL process. I have experience assisting hundreds of other business owners in applying for and getting approved. I am sharing the information, strategies, and general knowledge I have gained over the course of 2 months. I do not work at the SBA nor do I have any affiliation with the SBA.
Do to an extreme flood of requests for help, I may not be able to answer PM's or chat requests. I have setup an email you are welcome to contact me on, but due to the volume I may not be able to respond right away or at all. My email is [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
Some people have asked how they can support my efforts. While I do not ask for donations, our subreddit founder decided to setup a tip jar in case people want to show their support. To be clear I do not ask for donations for my help, but if you decide to spare anything I do appreciate it greatly. The tip jar can be found HERE.


13. QUESTION: My loan was obligated, already funded, or I already accepted the amount in the portal. I made a mistake with my COGS or revenue and I am not happy with the amount. Can I change it?
ANSWER: As of 6/12 loan modifications are now being allowed. You can contact [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) and request a "Loan Modification increase". It is a 3-4 week process that requires documentation. A second loan will be given for the difference from the first one. It will be processed as a 20xx series loan in the old system/portal. For more details email me. Note if you have not yet accepted the offer the normal process is much faster.


14. QUESTION: How do I show support for the volunteers and moderators for EIDL
ANSWER: For supporting Cue378, there is a tip jar listed above. If you wish to show support to our community moderators, a separate tip jar can be found HERE. Proceeds for this jar will be split between u/innocul8 and u/Scorpio14534. Donations in this jar do NOT go to Cue. Any amount is very appreciated. It takes a great deal of time and effort run the community and they are putting in a near full time effort.

15. QUESTION: I received my portal link, but when I go to create an account it just takes me to the login page. What can be done?
ANSWER: Follow these steps:
  1. Open the email to create your portal account. Right click on the green button that says, "create your account". Click "copy link address" or "copy hyperlink" depending on your browser.
  2. Use a VPN service, such as NordVPN or ProtonVPN (free), to connect to a VPN server in different state than yours, preferably on the opposite coast you are located.
  3. Open an incognito browser window, or private browser session if on firefox.
  4. Right click on the URL/web address field and paste the link you copied. Hit enter.
  5. You should then successfully be able to create a login, enter the portal, and accept your offer.
Alternately if you don't have a VPN or want to use one you can use a mobile phone to login incognito, with WiFi off on a cellular network, to create the account.

16. QUESTION: I was declined for "unsatisfactory credit". What are my options?
ANSWER: You have a few options.
  1. You can bring your vantage 3 score over 570 by paying down cards, when you are ready you can request the SBA re-pull your report and reactivate your account via [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
  2. You can request to add a co-borrower that has a higher score than 570 with no open bankruptcy and run their credit to reactivate your application.
You can expedite your request for a co-borrower by having this ready to go. You can also do this preemptively if you expect to be declined for credit. The co-borrower does NOT have to be involved with the business and can be anyone. The form is available here:
SBA Form 3501 - Adding Co-Borrower
Only fill out the following:
Line #14 - Add the co-borrowers information under owner #1
Line #15 - Answer question for co-borrower.
Line #16 - Answer question for co-borrower.
Sign page 10, co-borrower signs.
Ownership percentage can be 0% if co-borrower is not part of business.
Attach and send with your co-borrower request to [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) with your application number.
NOTE: If you have an urgent need to have your co-borrower request expedited, please email me at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) with the subject line: "ADDING CO-BORROWER REQUESTED URGENT" I will respond within 24 hours.

17. QUESTION: What documents are required? Will a loan officer contact me?
ANSWER: In most cases no documentation is required and everything is self certified. In some cases a LO will need to contact you to clarify some things about your business or request specific documents. In most cases you will never be contacted by or communicate with a loan officer.


18. QUESTION: What is the status of the Advance/Grant program? Can I still get a grant?
ANSWER: As most of you already know, the EIDL Advance/Grant program has ended and the full 20 billion in funding for the advance has been exhausted. The option has been removed from new applications. Getting funding for the advance as a new applicant at this time will not be possible.
For older applications please see this post for more information:
https://www.reddit.com/EIDL/comments/hr3l41/eidl_news_714_update_regarding_the_current_status/

19. QUESTION: What are the eligible uses of EIDL funds?
ANSWER: These loans may be used to pay fixed debts, payroll, accounts payable and other bills that can’t be paid because of the disaster’s impact. What are all the possible uses of the funds? The wording ‘obligations that are unable to be met due to lack of revenue’ seems to be a catch all, but how much so? The EIDL working capital loans may be used to pay fixed debts, payroll, accounts payable, and other bills that could have been paid had the disaster not occurred. The loans are not intended to replace lost sales or profits or for expansion.

20. QUESTION: I received a denial letter for the reason "ECONOMIC INJURY NOT SUSTAINED". What does this mean and what can I do?
ANSWER: This occurs when the numbers entered on your application for COGS are greater than your revenue. The SBA calculates economic injury based on the formula in question number 4. You can also be denied for this reason if the resulting number is less than your advance amount. Please note that the SBA is only taking into account revenue earned prior to the disaster date of 1/31/20 to calculate your economic injury. If your only revenue was earned after that date as a newer business you may not qualify.
If the numbers on your application were correct, you would not be eligible for an EIDL. If you made an error you can request an amendment and request reactivation of your application. I can assist with this process. You need at minimum Profit and Loss statements for the period 12 months prior to the disaster starting 1/31/20. Email me at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) with the subject: COGS DENIAL REVERSAL REQUESTED. Include your Reddit username. I will respond with instructions on how to file this amendment.

21. QUESTION: What is CAWEB and how can it help me track my loan disbursement and other status?
ANSWER: You can use the Capital Access Finance System to track your EIDL after your documents have been signed and submitted through funding. It allows you to see disbursement status and other details related to your loan.
****Hat tip to u/tahoechick36 for this amazing write up*\*
Using the Capital Access Finance System to track your EIDL after your documents have been signed and submitted through funding.
Visit caweb.sba.gov or click the link at the top of EIDL
Setting up an account:
You need a SBA Loan # to set up an account - for EIDL it appears on the first page of your documents, in the upper left hand area, and says "SBA Loan # XXXXXXXXXX.”
SBA loan #'s are 10 digits. Your Application # will NOT work for account set-up.
If you have a PPP Loan, you can use your SBA # for this loan to set up an account. Sometimes this # is easy to figure out, sometimes not. That has to do with an intermediary (like your bank) being involved, but if you can track down an actual SBA Loan #, you can go ahead and get registered without your EIDL loan number.
  1. On the home page click on "Not Enrolled?" in the top left. This takes you to a screen to enter info. You may come to hate this screen, this process is very finicky.
  2. Look at the rules for creating a User ID and Password by clicking on "Rules..." next to the fields.
  3. Write your exact ID & password down somewhere - if you ever get locked out and call the SBA for help, they are going to tell you that Borrowers are not supposed to be able to access CAFS CAWeb. Apparently we still can, so don't make this a big deal or maybe that will change!
  4. For user type - select "borrower" from the drop down menu.
  5. Fill in the highlighted fields with your info. Click on the "ZIP LOOKUP" button after you enter your zip code. This auto populates some other boxes, and registration won't work if you don't do this.
  6. For the country code in the phone number section enter "1" for the United States.
  7. Financial commitment ID is your Loan # - 10 digits.
  8. If you don't have a landline, it has been reported that just entering your mobile number in both fields works. You will have to select 3 of their security questions, enter the Captcha image info, then hit "submit" at the bottom.
If it didn't like the info you have entered, it will give you an error message for what part it didn't like, and you will have to try again, which requires re-entering quite a bit of the information. It's a pain.
But if it takes it, you're in! There may be a verification step now as well.
Finding your loan on CAWeb
  1. On the caweb homepage, login (if you aren't already), it will be personalized and show your name. You have to scroll down and check the "Agree to Terms" box when you are logging in.
  2. Click on "Borrower" in the top left, then click on "Borrower Search". This should take you to your "Loan List" showing the loan #, borrower name, loan type, amount, and loan status.
  3. PPP loans typically appear as "Active Un-Disbursed" - if your PPP is already funded don't worry about that. Your EIDL will show up as "Disbursed Current" if funds are on their way. It may say something else if you look immediately after you send back you Docs, but it should change pretty quickly. Logging out and back in again will sometimes refresh the status. Loan status will say "Active Un-Disbursed" until Treasury send the funds to your bank, then it changes to "Disbursed Current".


22. QUESTION: I received my portal invite link, however when I go to create an account I just get the message: "The user account has not been confirmed yet. Please confirm using the link in the e-mail". What can I do?
ANSWER: This is a known bug/error normally relating to either getting the invite ahead of schedule or other missing information in your file that would prevent the account creation from moving forward. Tier 2 cannot solve this and it need a special approach to resolve. Please email me with the subject line: "USER ACCOUNT HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED". Include your reddit username in the email somewhere. My address is [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])



submitted by cue378 to EIDL [link] [comments]

Beyond Ghislaine: The Maxwell Octopus

Robert Maxwell (born Ján Ludvík Hyman Binyamin Hoch) was born into a poor yiddish-speaking Jewish community in Czechoslovakia in 1923. When Nazi Germany invaded Czechoslovakia during the Second World War, Maxwell fled to France as part of an underground organization ferrying youth out of his homeland. Still a teenager, this would be his first taste of the world of spycraft, an occupation which would define the remainder of his inscrutable life. After several years spent engaged in underground resistance activities which saw him shuttled across Eastern Europe and the Middle East he eventually found himself back in France, now a member of the French Foreign Legion and an active participant in the French Resistance, utilizing the newly acquired pseudonym of Ivan du Maurier.
After participating in the Allied invasion of Normandy, Maxwell (soon to adopt the name of Leslie Johnson) was shortly recruited by British Intelligence. Already a seasoned veteran of international espionage, the young man's multilingualism and underground connections made him a valuable asset to the British government. He continued to work for Britain in the years leading up to the end of the war and in its immediate aftermath, ostensibly as a press attache to the foreign office in Berlin. His actual assignment was to interrogate captured German scientists, work likely done in conjunction with the Alsos Mission, a branch of the American Manhattan Project which cooperated with British forces to collect and classify information on Germany's atomic weapons program. Though the goal of Alsos was primarily to prevent sensitive information from falling into Soviet hands, Maxwell soon also became affiliated with Soviet intelligence due to his desire to seek out surviving relatives who still resided in his homeland, now under Soviet jurisdiction.
He changed his name for the last time in 1945, and as the newly-christened Captain Robert Maxwell married Elisabeth Meynard, a native of France and the future mother of all nine of his children. Still working for allied intelligence, Maxwell began to anticipate the value his work could have on the private market. He started to gather German and Russian scientific documents and research papers which were unknown in the English-speaking world, with the intention of later selling or publishing them for profit.
Meanwhile, in America, a young scientist and child of Czech immigrants by the name of Frank Malina was establishing an international reputation for himself in the field of rocketry and aeronautics. As a graduate student at Caltech, Malina and his longtime friend Jack Parsons founded the research center that would later become the Jet Propulsion Lab. Parsons, himself a brilliant young rocket scientist, was also an avid follower of notorious British occultist Aleister Crowley. Parsons' involvement with Crowley's Thelema movement was so deep that he would eventually become the leader of the California branch of the Ordo Templi Orientis, a Thelemite initiatory organization whose practices included ritualistic sex magic and the summoning of supernatural beings. Thelemites shunned traditional religion and morality in favor of a belief in the supreme power of the will, an echo of Hitler's Nazi philosophy which was itself rooted in the same spiritualist and theosophist ideas as Crowley's. The supreme goal of Thelema, as with all occult practices, is the ultimate union of mind and matter, the combination of the disciplines of science, art, philosophy and religion into a single comprehensible whole. While continuing to work closely with Malina at this time, Parsons also became closely affiliated with Scientology founder and fellow occultist L. Ron Hubbard.
Malina and Parsons went on to form the Aerojet Corporation, a rocket and missile manufacturer from which Parsons was ousted in 1944. In early 1945, Aerojet was purchased by General Tire, a company whose business included contracts with the U.S. military during the second World War. Later in 1945, Malina's research facility was moved to the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico where the first Atomic Bomb was detonated that same year.
Leaving the British Army in 1947, Robert Maxwell utilized his military and intelligence connections to go into business as the British and US distributor for Springer Verlag, a Berlin-based publisher of scientific texts which had been taken over by Allied forces after the war. Maxwell soon purchased a majority share of the company, which he re-dubbed Pergamon Press, a reference to the ancient Greek city and center of pagan worship of the same name. During this time, Maxwell also became heavily involved with the newly-designated Israeli intelligence service Mossad, a connection which would arguably remain his primary allegiance throughout the remainder of his life.
In 1947 Frank Malina left rocketry and his native country behind to move to France, ostensibly because he had grown disenchanted with the military applications of his research, although at this time he was also being investigated by the FBI for his undisclosed involvement with American communist organizations in his youth (an ideology Parsons had also toyed with before moving onto more esoteric concerns). Malina took a job in Paris as Secretariat of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), where he worked under famed English eugenicist Julian Huxley, the father of mysticist author Aldous Huxley.
Back in America, Parsons was also increasingly hounded by the FBI. He devised a plan to flee to Israel after he was offered a job working for the infant Israeli rocket program, but a suspicious transfer of documents led to allegations of espionage from the FBI (later dismissed in court). Parsons remained in America until his 1952 death in a mysterious laboratory explosion, the cause of which would never be sufficiently explained.
After his stint with UNESCO, Malina left the organization to pursue his interest in art. In 1968, while still living in Paris, he founded 'Leonardo', an academic journal published by MIT Press which covered the application of science to the arts. The journal remained his primary concern until his death from natural causes in 1981, at which point control of Leonardo turned over to his son Roger Malina.
Maxwell, meanwhile, was busy building his publishing and media empire, amassing a variety of subsidiaries including newspapers, television networks and tech companies. He spent six years as a Member of British Parliament in the 1960s before being defeated in the election of 1970. Though nominally a British citizen, all of his children were born in the wealthy suburbs of Paris, their mother's native land. As his wealth and influence rose, Maxwell remained deeply entangled with MI6, the KGB, the CIA and Mossad.
In the 1970s Maxwell became involved in an intelligence operation centered around PROMIS, a database management software program that could be described as a forerunner to modern internet search engines. PROMIS was groundbreaking in its time, allowing the user to aggregate disparate databases into a single accessible interface. Though initially designed to help prosecutor's offices track and share data, the program quickly caught the attention of intelligence agencies who foresaw its potential for monitoring and compiling information in a variety of fields. In a sense, their plan could be viewed as a nascent version of the information gathering activities which would be exposed by Edward Snowden decades later.
The U.S. Department of Justice hired two men with connections to the Israeli defense forces to infiltrate Inslaw, the company which had produced PROMIS, under the pretense of being potential buyers for the Israeli Public Prosecutor's office. In reality, the men were sent to steal PROMIS and bring it back to their clients in U.S. and Israeli intelligence without Inslaw's knowledge. Their mission accomplished, the thieves soon devised bigger plans for the software than its application to their own systems. They hatched a scheme to sell the software to foreign intelligence agencies with covert back doors, thus obtaining a worldwide database of the intelligence activities of all the major powers in the world. In order to enact this plan they needed a middle-man with deep connections in the global intelligence community, someone who would be trusted as a known quantity by all. Naturally, they turned to Robert Maxwell.
Maxwell used his corporate empire (he had quietly purchased several fledgling Israeli tech companies which served as fronts for the sales) to broker deals with China, the KGB, and anyone else who would be interested in the ground-breaking software. Before long he even began to double-cross his own handlers, helping create new backdoors for China and Israel so that they in turn could spy on the Americans. The software began to find its way into banking systems and government databases worldwide, growing into a vast interconnected network which came to be dubbed "The Octopus". At the head of this Octopus was not any particular state government or intelligence agency, but Robert Maxwell himself, the only man who had been able to game the technology to his own advantage without being taken advantage of in turn.
When Inslaw discovered how their technology was being used they filed a series of lawsuits against the DOJ alleging that PROMIS was illegally stolen from their company. Without these lawsuits, it is unlikely that any of the information regarding PROMIS would have ever come to light. The lawsuits were predictably ruled in favor of the US Government, bankrupting Inslaw in the process. Danny Casolaro, a journalist who was covering the story (the man who coined the term 'The Octopus') was found dead in a hotel room in 1991, his wrists slashed several times in an apparent suicide. Casolaro had complained of threatening phone calls in the days leading up to his death, and his family have long asserted that he was murdered.
Eventually, Maxwell's double-dealing caught up with him. At the behest of China's Secret Service he sold a compromised version of PROMIS to Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, birthplace of the American atomic bomb. This modified version of PROMIS installed at the Los Alamos facility was designed to give Chinese Intelligence access to America's nuclear secrets. The affair became the subject of several FBI investigations regarding Maxwell's conduct, documents regarding which have never been made publicly available except in a prohibitively redacted form. Western intelligence agencies, Israel in particular, were incensed at Maxwell's dealings with China, which they saw as a betrayal of his allegiance. For the first time, serious discussion of Maxwell as a potential liability began to take place.
In 1991, while travelling aboard his yacht 'The Lady Ghislaine' (named after his youngest and favorite daughter) Maxwell fell overboard into the Atlantic ocean. His body was recovered the next morning and the cause of his death was officially ruled as a heart attack which led to an accidental drowning. Rumors of his murder continue to persist to this day, occassionally spurred on by daughter Ghislaine herself. Robert Maxwell was buried on the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem, at a funeral attended by several Israeli government officials and known intelligence operatives.
In the aftermath of his death, Maxwell's empire fell apart. Financial improprieties were discovered and the Maxwell companies were soon bankrupt. The stage was set for a new generation of Maxwells to assume his position.
Twin sisters Isabel and Christine Maxwell moved to Silicon Valley in the 1980s, and despite having no apparent formal training in technology, founded the early internet search engine and e-mail provider Magellan. After selling this company, Christine would go on to form Chiliad, a data analysis company with its headquarters in the Washington D.C. suburb of Herndon, VA. An announcement on the appointment of Christine as the company's interim CEO in 2013 boasts
"The company’s Discovery/Alert big data search tool – operationally proven by the US law enforcement community – reaches across information stored in incompatible databases, documents and applications held in separate departments and organizations to provide the proactive, real-time situational awareness necessary for protection and preparedness."
-A perfectly accurate description of the PROMIS software co-opted by her father a few decades earlier. A 2008 article in Business Wire quotes Chiliad CEO Dan Ferranti as saying "In just a few years, Chiliad will be known as principal arms supplier to the information age."
In 1986 Christine married Roger Malina, the MIT-educated son of Frank Malina, and current editor of his father's 'Leonardo' journal. While it is unclear where and when the couple first met, it would seem that there was no shortage of opportunities for the two to cross paths considering their long shared family histories of involvement in Parisian society, technology, government service, and science publishing.
After two failed early marriages, Christine's twin sister Isabel would herself find love with a man named Al Seckel. Seckel was an avid atheist activist and collector of optical illusions, a self-styled intellectual whose academic credentials were overstated at best and non-existent at worst. The source of Seckel's finances were never entirely clear. He described himself as a dealer of rare books, but those who dealt with him in this capacity described him as a con artist and swindler. Seckel ingratiated himself with the academic society around Caltech and was well known for the lavish parties he threw, often packed with celebrities of academia and entertainment. His primary academic concern seemed to be the field of cognitive psychology, specifically the psychology of perception. It was a subject which surely overlapped with the interests of his brother-in-law, editor of the 'Leonardo' Roger Malina.
Many of Seckel and Malina's interests would also be shared by the longtime companion of their wives' younger sister Ghislaine, the namesake of the boat from which their father fell to his death. This man, Jeffrey Epstein, is likely already well-known to the reader. Ghislaine allegedly met Epstein in the early 1990s, a time when she was still heavily involved in her father's business dealings. Suffice it to say that Epstein would seem to fit right in with the Maxwell archetype- a shady cosmopolite of mysterious origins with unaccountable finances, questionable morality and deep ties to the worlds of scientific academia (especially at Caltech and MIT), technology, finance, French society, and, perhaps most importantly, international intelligence- specifically as related to the state of Israel. In 2010, two years after Epstein's conviction on charges of soliciting a child for prostitution, Al Seckel hosted a "private scientific conference" on Epstein's island which was attended by numerous superstars of scientific academia. As a side note, Epstein's island is known to contain a mysterious temple, the design of which makes use of optical illusions, labyrinthine motifs, a statue of Poseidon and twin golden owls, figures associated with occult and pagan symbolism. The purpose of the temple has never been fully explained.
Al Seckel would eventually be found dead in 2015 near his home in France after having apparently fallen off a cliff. After his death it was discovered that his marriage to Isabel Maxwell was never legitimate, as Seckel had still been legally married to a previous wife. In the last years of his life Seckel was reported as having been trying to sell the personal papers of his late father-in-law Robert Maxwell.
With Epstein apparently dead (typically, under mysterious circumstances) and Ghislaine Maxwell arrested, one might be tempted to feel a sense of closure regarding their crimes. The truth, as outlined here, is far more complicated. In all likelihood, the activities of the youngest Maxwell and her notorious associate were actually just a small branch of a much larger story, one with deep roots in the history of post-WWII academia, society, international espionage, and perhaps even the occult. It is difficult to draw conclusions from such disparate facts, and it is unlikely that the questions which arise can be easily answered. At a bare minimum, it seems fair to suggest that there is far more to the story of Robert Maxwell and his extended family than meets the eye.
submitted by evil_pope to Epstein [link] [comments]

The Dominance of Public Ownership in the Chinese Socialist Market Economy

There are many that seem to believe that China today is a capitalist country, and that ever since 1978, China took the capitalist road. The relative decline of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in China in comparison to the private sector is used as damning evidence in favor of this view.
I will take this article for example:
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/why-chinas-state-owned-companies-still-have-a-key-role-to-play/
China’s private sector - which has been revving up since the global financial crisis - is now serving as the main driver of China’s economic growth. The combination of numbers 60/70/80/90 are frequently used to describe the private sector's contribution to the Chinese economy: they contribute 60% of China’s GDP, and are responsible for 70% of innovation, 80% of urban employment and provide 90% of new jobs. Private wealth is also responsible for 70% of investment and 90% of exports.
All of this is seemingly supported by official Chinese data AT FIRST GLANCE.
Taking a closer look, there may be problems in this combination of numbers. While China’s ownership structure has changed dramatically since reform began, claims that the private sector now dominates the economy may be exaggerated.
This comes from a misunderstanding of the use of the terms "state" and "nonstate" in Chinese official statistics.
https://www.heritage.org/testimony/chinese-state-owned-enterprises-and-us-china-economic-relations
The discussion of SOEs has been undermined by a fundamental error: the conflation of restructured, share-holding firms with the truly private sector. Share-holding SOEs are manifestly not private actors and assessments of the corporate sector that assume so are fatally flawed from the outset. The origin of this mistake is historical. As quasi-state entities emerged and proliferated, it was clear some sort of separate treatment was necessary and the concept of “non-state” was created. This was never intended to indicate “private”—quite the opposite: it was meant to signify that the creation of corporate forms quite different from SOEs could occur without privatization and its ideological pitfalls.
The meaning of “non-state” is very well understood by the Chinese government. The (sometimes willful) misunderstanding outside China rests on two shaky pillars. The first is a mis-rendering of “non-state”—where the PRC sees the opposite of state as non-state, many foreign observers see the opposite of state as “private” and simply re-label accordingly. The second is more sophisticated and based on the share-holding change.
Neither specification of share-holders nor sale of stock by itself does anything to alter state control. The large majority of firms listed on domestic stock markets are specifically designated as state-owned. The sale of small minority stakes on foreign exchanges could be construed as recasting mainstays such as CNPC (through its list vehicle PetroChina), China Mobile, and Chinalco as non-state entities of some form. However, they are still centrally directed SOEs, as explicitly indicated by the Chinese government.
Derek Scissors’s claim (the author of the article I am quoting) also has the support of empirical evidence as well.
https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-why-chinese-stocks-are-a-state-controlled-facade-2010-6
Even after the enactment of the non-tradable share reform in 2005, the free- float ratio of China A shares remains the lowest in Asia (Exhibit 27).
The State-owned Asset and Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is the government entity charged with holding and administering the large state-owned positions. These shares were classified as non-tradable until 2005, when the non-tradable share reform gave share dividends to free-float shareholders in exchange for making the government-held shares tradable (but with certain constraints). Over time, we believe that the SASAC will continue to sell down these holdings on the margin, while keeping the bulk of the shares.
Thus the control and ownership that U.S. share ownership represents is completely different than what Chinese share ownership represents. Simply put, Chinese shares don't translate into effective ownership of their underlying companies.
https://books.google.com/books/about/Capitalism_with_Chinese_Characteristics.html?id=YBpih2Q1X9kC&source=kp_book_description
The OECD economists assign the entire output by legal-person shareholding firms to the private sector. Is this a reasonable approach? Getting this question right is critical. In 1998, legal-person shareholding firms accountedfor 40 percent (11.3/28.9) of the purported private sector. Excluding these firms would reduce the share of the private sector in industrial value-addedfrom 28.9 percent in 1998 to only 17.6 percent (i.e., 28.9 percent minus 11.3 percent). For 2005, the private sector exclusive of legal-person shareholding firms would be 39.8 percent rather than 71.2 percent (i.e., 71.2 percent minus 31.4 percent). This is another illustration of a common refrain in this book – getting the details right matters.
Legal-person shareholding refers to cross-shareholding by firms. Probably because of the connotations of this term, the OECD economists might have assumed that legal-person shareholding implies that China has a keiretsu arrangement similar to that in Japan where firms own each others’ stocks. The difference with Japan, however, is that in China much of the legal-person share capital originates in the state sector, via SOEs establishing or holding significant equity stakes in other firms. These firms then become affiliates or subsidiaries of the SOEs. The subsidiaries of the SOEs, on account of their final ownership, are still SOEs.

Another well-known SOE on the list classified by the OECD study as private is SAIC Motor Corporation Limited (SAIC Motor). In the NBS dataset, the state share of SAIC Motor’s share capital structure is 0 percent; it is 70 percent legal-person shareholding and 30 percent individual shareholding. So this firm qualifies as a private firm in the OECD definition. But SAIC Motor is not even remotely a private firm. SAIC Motor was established in 1997; its predecessor was Shanghai Gear Factory. In 1997, 30 percent of the share capital was issued on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the rest of the share capital was held by Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), which is 100 percent owned by the Shanghai government. Because the Shanghai government owns SAIC Motor via SAIC – a legal-person shareholder – the state share capital is reduced to zero; however, from a control perspective, there is little question about who controls this firm.
The example of SAIC Motor also illustrates the nature of the SOE reforms in the 1990s. Much of the reform effort had nothing to do with actually changing the owners of the firms but rather it was directed at securitizing the full but previously implicit equity holdings of the state in the SOEs. Although these reform measures copy the superficial forms of a capitalistic market economy, none of them has anything to do with its essence – transferring corporate control from government to private investors.
The high concentration of the ownership structure of the legal-person shareholding firms is another sign that these firms are not private at all. In the NBS dataset, SAIC Motor has the most dispersed shareholding structure among the legal-person shareholding firms because 30 percent of its shares are held by individual shareholders. (This is because the firm is listed.) In contrast, of 16,871 legal-person shareholding firms in the NBS dataset for 1998, 75 percent have zero individual share capital. The average individual share capital is only 3.7 percent. This is entirely expected given the heavily accounting nature of the SOE reforms. As evidence, 7,612 of these so-called legal-person shareholding firms are actually factories – they are simply production subsidiaries of other SOEs. This explains the extraordinary concentration of ownership and control of these firms.

A view focusing on the control-right problems of the SOEs ought to have led to the next logical step of contract reforms – management buyouts of the SOEs. But, in the early 1990s, the Chinese leaders reversed the policy on the grounds that the contract reforms did not work. Instead, they embraced an industrial policy approach that actually augmented the control rights of those SOEs that the government had decided to retain. In the 1980s, collective TVEs, such as Kelon, had state revenue rights but private control rights. In the 1990s, in the case of the large SOEs, the situation was completely reversed. Most of the large SOEs, which were listed on China’s two stock exchanges, had partial private revenue rights but complete state control rights.
Between 1990 and 2003, only 6.97 percent of the initial public offerings on the two Chinese stock exchanges were from private-sector companies. The rest were SOEs that issued minority shares but in which managerial control remained very clearly in state hands.27 Put differently, because many shareholding firms in China have private revenue rights but their control rights still rest with the government, they should be considered as state-controlled. According to a detailed study of more than 600 firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 1995, the three main groups of shareholders – state, legal persons, and individual shareholders – each controlled about 30 percent of the outstanding shares (Xu and Wang 1997). This stock split has remained more or less constant since then, although the government has plans to reduce the state shares. The control rights of these firms were overwhelmingly state. According to the same study, although individual shareholding constituted 30 percent of the outstanding shares, on average individual shareholders occupied less than 0.3 percent of the seats on the boards of 154 companies, whereas on average the state was over-represented on the boards. On average, the state retained 50 percent of the seats even though its equity shares amounted to 30 percent. There were no proxy voting procedures, thereby putting the individual shareholders in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the institu- ` tional investors such as the government agencies. This usurpation of rightful shareholder power is direct evidence that the state harbors no intention of relinquishing its control rights even over those firms that have explicitly private revenue rights.
What does this mean? The mixed ownership corporate enterprises that emerged in China in recent decades are still to a large extent controlled by the state and should be considered to be a part of the public sector. This has considerable implications for what is being discussed at hand. In Chinese statistics, the nonstate sector includes these mixed ownership firms. Thus by making the huge mistake of conflating "nonstate" with "private," analysts mistakenly place mixed ownership firms into the private sector. However, this can be corrected and we come up with the following conclusion instead.
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/17/chinas-soe-sector-is-bigger-than-some-would-have-us-think/
The results of forcing such a choice are illustrative. With non-wholly state-funded LLCs included, the public share of fixed investment in the first quarter of 2016 is near 60 per cent. Data from 2013 show the public sector still accounting for only 30 per cent of total firms but roughly 55 per cent of assets, 45 per cent of revenue and 40 per cent of profits.

Those who claim private leadership can say that non-wholly state-funded LLCs are not the same as SOEs. The stronger point is that even some pure SOEs are qualitatively different than they were 20 years ago. But it is a large and mistaken jump from these correct observations to treating mixed or ‘non-state’ as equivalent to private, which Xinhua and many other observers frequently do. The non-traditional-SOE sector may account for 60 per cent of GDP; the private sector does not.
These numbers show that the public sector still maintains its dominance in its contribution GDP and investment.
However, the question still lingers whether contributions to GDP, investment, revenue, etc are accurate in making deductions about the ownership structures in an economy. Chinese economists propose that assets are the most important indicator to evaluate the status of any form of ownership, especially public ownership, in the national economy.
There is strong theoretical reasoning to prove this as well.
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-13-6895-0
Actually, to rely on assets to evaluate the dominant status of public ownership does not only meet the requirement of government policies, but is also deeply rooted in economic theories as well. Classical Marxian economists usually referred to the concept of “property right” when talking about ownership, i.e., the ownership of material production. For example, Marx, when making discussions on the basic features of the new, future society, spoke of the society as “collectively-owned, based on common ownership of the means of production”. Such a concept of ownership of the means of material production had been long in use, which was associated with the social background before the 1950s when various non-material means of production (such as various intangible assets, trademarks, marketing network, computer software and science and technologies) had not been common or important in social production. With technological advances and changes in the means of capitalist production, the various non-material modes became more and more important in the establishment of the capitalist relation of production. Therefore, the denotation and connotations of ownership became richer and richer. For example, some international enterprises originating in developed countries now make use of their advantages in product brands and supply chains to organize international production with little or no reliance on the share of capital investment in their hands; nor do they have to build any facility physically for material production. As a matter of fact, Marx seemed to have foreseen this as he sometimes talked about ownership with vague denotation and used such poorly-defined terms as “external conditions of labor”: “Any way to distribute consumer materials is just the distribution of the productive condition itself… Since the factors of production have to be distributed this way, the distribution of consumer materials has to go this way, too.” Here he did not mention the concept of means of production, but “productive condition” and “factors of production” that had an even wider range of connotations.
Using assets to evaluate the position of public ownership in the Chinese economy, we come to the conclusion that public ownership maintains its dominance.
Public ownership as the dominant form is supported by data. By the end of 2012, the total amount of the operating assets of China’s thrice industries was 487.53 trillion yuan (including the assets of individually-owned businesses), among which 53%, or 258.39 trillion yuan, was owned by the public sector. These data showed that, even with the strictest measurement, public ownership was still the dominant form of the national economy in China, and from the perspective of the ownership structure, the socialist nature of the Chinese society did not change; nor did the reforms change the color of the society. As a matter of fact, the socialist nature of our country also decides that the size of the nonoperating assets of the public sector is also considerable. When the nonoperating assets were included, the total amount of the assets of the Chinese society would be 518.13 trillion yuan (excluding the noncultivated undeveloped resource assets), among which the public owned 288.99 trillion yuan, or 55.78%. The national asset and its size are the externalized cost for efficiency improvement in the operational fields, in which the efficiency of enterprises relies heavily on such social support. Therefore, inspection on the ownership structure of the economy cannot ignore the nonoperating assets.
Now the question is, does this conclusion about the year 2012 apply currently to the year 2020? The answer is a yes.
In terms of the long-term trend, the dominant status of China’s public ownership is guaranteed. First, starting from 2009, the reforms on the ownership structure in China took a turn from rapid changes to fine adjustments. In the first phase (2004–2008), the proportion of public ownership, measured by asset, in the secondary and tertiary industries decreased from 62.73 to 55.48%, while the proportion of the nonpublic ownership increased from 37.27 to 44.52%. In the second phase (2009–2012), however, the proportion of public ownership decreased from 54.32 to 50.44%, and that of the nonpublic, from 45.68 to 49.56%. The numbers showed that the reforms on the ownership structure in China had progressed from wide-range and large-scale changes to a stable phase of fine adjustments. The assets of the public and nonpublic sectors have drawn to stabilization, which suggests that the dominating status of the public sector, measured by asset, will not change in the long-term trend, and the economic system that is based on the dominance of public ownership has been stabilized. Second, the strategic reorganization of SOEs and the public investment used in the state macro-adjustments will continue to accumulate new assets for the publicly-owned economy, which ensures the growth in quantity of both the publicly- and the non-publicly-owned economies. With public ownership as the dominant form, as long as the publicly-owned assets do not increase at a much slower speed than the non-publicly-owned, there is no question for public ownership to remain dominant.
If one needs more quantitative evidence to prove that ownership structure has been stable recently, one need not look further than the Chinese statistical yearbooks, which provide us continuous data on publicly owned assets (but note that this data only is on the industrial sector and leaves out the primary and tertiary sectors).
I made a spreadsheet here which has data from the Chinese statistical yearbooks on the ratio of state owned assets to total assets over time (from 2004 to 2018).
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1eUUMr_sUJxo8ZCRwodsXAQVtjVgv4Vity2ACpe01cCA/edit?usp=sharing
The data obviously shows that, just as the authors of the book predicted, the ownership adjustments in the Chinese economy have been very small and have largely stabilized with no further retreat of the public sector occuring. Thus we can still conclude that the public sector still maintains its dominance in China.
The Chinese statistical yearbooks can be found here:
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/
What I find interesting however is that the authors in the book I quoted from earlier come to the conclusion that the public sector makes up only 35% of output and 25% of employment in the secondary and tertiary industries, which may run counter to Derek Scissors’s claims about the larger contribution of the public sector in GDP, investment, etc. Whatever the case, the point still stands that by using assets as the main indicator, the Chinese public sector still maintains its dominance in the Chinese economy.
How does the position of the Chinese public sector compare to the capitalist countries?
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943
First, the publicly-owned assets in China have a higher share. In the secondary and tertiary industries only in 2012, the publicly-owned economic assets reached 226 trillion yuan in China and, according to the study on China’s sovereign assets and liabilities by Li Yang, et al.,10 the non-operating assets (excluding state land resources) reached 30.7 trillion yuan in 2010. The two together accounted for 53.62% of the total assets of the secondary and tertiary industries. In contrast, in the national balance sheet of the U.K., the share of the public sectors is as low as negligible: before the global financial crisis, the net assets of the U.K.’s public departments accounted for 6% of its total assets while in 2010, the percentage was 0 (Appendix Table 24). Similarly, the U.S. owned a total of 2.7 trillion dollar assets according to the national balance sheet of 2011 published by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Appendix Table 25) while the total assets owned by the U.S. residents and non-profit organizations reached 71 trillion dollars at the same times, giving the government assets a share of only 3.7% (Appendix Table 26). Canada has the same story in that its public sectors owned 2.4% of the total assets of its national economy in 2008 (Appendix Table 27). Germany, as the largest economy in Europe, was once considered to have one of the largest shares of SOEs, but the total assets of its state departments plunged in share, from 1.9% in 2007 to 0.1% in 2011 (Appendix Table 28), and all of its SOEs had a collective amount of assets that did not exceed 100 billion euro.11 Even when we took a round number of 100 billion, the total stateowned assets in Germany was still less than 1.3 trillion euro. The story is somewhat different for the catching-up countries such as Japan and South Korea in that they have relatively higher shares of publicly-owned assets. In Japan, for example, the total assets of public departments had a rapid decrease in share from 8.6% in 2007 to 2.6% in 2011 after the global financial crisis. Meanwhile, South Korea has always managed a high share of publicly-owned assets, which was 18.6% in 2011 (Appendix Table 29). Evidently, we have a much higher share of publicly-owned assets in China compared to capitalist countries, especially when compared to the public departments of the developed capitalist countries.
Even compared to the supposedly "mixed" or "state capitalist" economies of East Asia, publicly owned assets in China are a much larger share of the total than are present in Japan or South Korea, thus affirming the socialist (rather than “state capitalist”) nature of the Chinese economy.
One final question remains however: where is the Chinese economy headed in the next few decades?
The answer can be found in mixed ownership reform. Today, Chinese firms are reorganizing into mixed ownership firms where public sector and private sector firms are intermeshed and the divisions between them are blurred. One thing to note however is that the state will still maintain its dominance in these mixed ownership firms. This can be seen in the asset composition of mixed ownership firms.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02529203.2014.999905
In the absence of precise data on the different ownership components of corporate enterprises, we can only disaggregate their public and non-public components internally. The data from Yang Xinming and Yang Xuechun’s measurement of the total assets of the mixed ownership economy in 2008 indicate that the public and the private component account for 65 and 35 percent of the total respectively. After calculating the paid-in capital structure from the 2004 census data, we find that the public and private components accounted for 63 and 37 percent of the total respectively, as shown in Table 8. We therefore estimate the proportion of public assets in the total mixed ownership economy to have been 63 percent in 2004-2007 and 65 percent in 2008 and beyond.

Secondly, as indicated in Table 7, the assets of the mixed ownership economy represented by corporate enterprises have been growing extremely fast and are the largest in terms of scale. In 2012, this sector’s assets accounted for 51.8 percent of total productive assets in secondary and tertiary industry, ahead of all other types of enterprises; moreover, the sector is one in which the state-owned economic component is dominant. These data and this analysis offer an empirical basis for the arrangements for deepening reform set out in the Decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CCCPC, which notes that the mixed economy is an important means of realizing the basic economic system and is conducive to amplifying the role of state-owned capital and strengthening the dynamism, control and influence of the state-owned economy.
What the Chinese leadership seeks now is the mutual development of both the public and private sectors in mixed ownership enterprises instead of one sector developing at the expense of the other.
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943
Public ownership that dominates the asset structure is very tolerant of the non-publicly-owned economy. The dominating status of the publicly-owned assets provides material support for and is fundamental to China’s socialist ownership, underlies realization of common prosperity, offers a carrier for social functions to operate and, at the same time, strongly propels the development of the non-publicly-owned economy. In fact, the dominating status of the non-publicly-owned economy in output, employment, and taxation is the premise of its existence and development. According to our estimation, among the secondary and tertiary industries in China in 2012, the proportions of added value of the non-publicly- and publicly-owned economies were 67.59 and 32.41%, respectively, and new employment, 75.20 and 24.80%, respectively. Meanwhile, the businesses in the primary industry, such as agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery, are mostly comprised of family-based ones. Such development of both publicly- and non-publicly-owned economies with their respective status in asset size not matching their corresponding contributions is determined by their distinctive distributions across economic areas, and it also meets the demand of efficiency by the dominating market and by the external economics. Therefore, the domination in asset size by the publicly-owned economy together with the dominating contributions to output and employment made by the non-publicly-owned economy must stand side by side and march forward together. This is the foundation in practice for the “two unswervinglies” policy
In addition:
In addition, with further adjustments of the ownership structure, the dislocation of the domination in asset size of the public sector and the domination in economic contributions of the nonpublic sector will only be furthered. Actually, only with its rapid development can the nonpublic sector fulfill its role as an indispensable part to the socialist market economy, which will further drive SOEs to improve their efficiency so that mutual development will be achieved; and only with complete fusion of the two sectors brought by further improvement of the production efficiency and socialization of them can the primary stage of socialism has a chance to march to a higher stage.
In other words, the current mixed ownership reforms are setting up a huge building block for socialist China to step into a higher stage of socialism, bringing it closer to communism. So when you see articles like these from CGTN, please do not worry! Opening the “commanding heights” of the economy to private/foreign investment and competition is only a measure to further mixed ownership reforms and will not challenge the dominance of public ownership in the Chinese economy.
https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-18/China-unveils-guideline-on-improving-the-socialist-market-economy-QB6Vn3GVbO/index.html
There is a lot more Marxist theoretical backing for mixed ownership reform, but considering the size of this post, the theory behind the mixed ownership reforms will probably have to be something to write for another post.
Anyway, I’ll still leave behind some readings that will be useful to understand the combination of the public sector and market and the intermeshment of the public and private sectors in the Chinese economy to those who are curious.
https://stalinsmoustache.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/chapter-4-chinas-socialist-market-economy-pre-publication.pdf
https://stalinsmoustache.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/not-some-other-ism-06-pre-publication.pdf
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811327261 (chapter 1)
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943 (start at page 183)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CPE-10-2018-011/full/html
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CPE-04-2019-0006/full/html
https://philpapers.org/rec/BOEISA-2
I also HIGHLY RECOMMEND reading the articles in the following two journals (using scihub to get past the paywalls):
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rssc20
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rict20
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